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nloadeAn optical authentication system based on imaging of
excitation-selected lanthanide luminescence
Miguel R. Carro-Temboury,* Riikka Arppe,* Tom Vosch,† Thomas Just Sørensen†
Secure data encryption relies heavily on one-way functions, and copy protection relies on features that are difficult
to reproduce. We present an optical authentication system based on lanthanide luminescence from physical one-
way functions or physical unclonable functions (PUFs). They cannot be reproduced and thus enable unbreakable
encryption. Further, PUFs will prevent counterfeiting if tags with unique PUFs are grafted onto products. We have
developed an authentication system that comprises a hardware reader, image analysis, and authentication software
and physical keys that we demonstrate as an anticounterfeiting system. The physical keys are PUFs made from
random patterns of taggants in polymer films on glass that can be imaged following selected excitation of particular
lanthanide(III) ions doped into the individual taggants. This form of excitation-selected imaging ensures that by
using at least two lanthanide(III) ion dopants, the random patterns cannot be copied, because the excitation selec-
tion will fail when using any other emitter. With the developed reader and software, the random patterns are read
and digitized, which allows a digital pattern to be stored. This digital pattern or digital key can be used to authen-
ticate the physical key in anticounterfeiting or to encrypt any message. The PUF key was produced with a staggering
nominal encoding capacity of 73600. Although the encoding capacity of the realized authentication system reduces
to 6 × 10104, it is more than sufficient to completely preclude counterfeiting of products.d fro
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 INTRODUCTION
Secure communication and authentication of products pose major so-
cietal challenges. An optical authentication system based on physical
unclonable functions (PUFs) may provide the solution. Using PUFs
in an anticounterfeiting systemwill address the billion-dollar economic
losses imposed by counterfeiting (1–3) and can potentially save lives if
used to guarantee the authenticity of medicine (4–8). The randomness
inherent in PUFs can be used for unbreakable public key encryption (9).
The decryption key cannot be guessed, and because a PUF, by defini-
tion, cannot be copied, only the key holder may decipher the encrypted
message. Here, we present a newoptical authentication systembased on
PUFpatterns of lanthanide-doped zeolite taggants in polymer films that
are read using excitation-selected imaging of the lanthanide dopants.
The system is demonstrated in the context of an anticounterfeiting system.
In anticounterfeiting, the established technologies all use tags that
are the result of a deterministic process (10, 11). As a consequence, they
all rely on restricted access to the ink or printing technology, which
makes them susceptible to counterfeiting—even DNA tags are readily
read and copied if a suitable incentive is present (10, 12). The highly
secure encoding method presented here is different in nature because
it uses statistically unique physical keys based on PUFs (13), which are
based on nondeterministic, random features of the anticounterfeiting
tag, making it impossible to duplicate even by the manufacturer, let
alone the counterfeiters (13–21).
The presented authentication system is based on physical keysmade
fromphysical one-way functions better known as PUFs (14, 22–24).We
make these unique random patterns in a stochastic process, where
taggants supported in a polymer thin film create a random pattern on
the substrate of choice (16). By imaging a selected area of the thin film, a
unique physical key is created. Such a PUF key can be tagged onto everysingle blister pack of pills or designer hand bag, and each product will
feature a unique key. All physical keys are read, and their digital keys are
stored in a database, thereby allowing each product to be uniquely iden-
tified throughout the supply chain.
The physical key is read using three, energetically closely spaced,
blue laser lines, each selectively exciting different lanthanide ions. The
emission following the selective excitation is used to image the key. The
control of excitation light rather than emission light resolves the differ-
ent taggants used to form the unique pattern that is the PUF key. Upon
each excitation wavelength, a different and unique random pattern
emerges, and the digitized and combined pattern forms the unique
digital key. This new method of reading the random pattern is dif-
ferent from knownmethods of optical multiplexing, which are read
by analyzing the color composition of the emitted light (12, 25). When
this new readout mode is combined with unique parameters for digitiz-
ing and comparing readouts, we have created a tamper-proof optical
authentication system.
Here, we demonstrate the excitation-resolved optical authentication
concept for anticounterfeiting using physical keys made from zeolites
dopedwith europium(III), terbium(III), or dysprosium(III) ions immo-
bilized in a polyvinyl alcohol (PVA) thin film (see Fig. 1).We exploit the
narrow absorption lines of the lanthanides and lanthanide centered
emission to resolve up to three binary responses, depending on the pres-
ence or absence of a given lanthanide in a given pixel (see Fig. 1). By
using three lanthanide(III) ions, we achieve very high encoding capaci-
ties. The encoding capacity of our system (cp) is defined by the number
of possible responses exhibited by a random pattern (see Fig. 1). With
three lanthanide(III) ions, we can achieve seven different responses,
which we visualize using a standard color scheme (c = 7; RGB-CMYK).
In the examples presented here, we image an area of 60 pixels × 60 pixels
(p = 3600), which gives a maximal encoding capacity of the proposed
authentication system of 73600. Because the encoding capacity of the ran-
dom pattern is infinite for all practical purposes, there will never be two
identical keys, ensuring that the physical keys are impossible to copy.
Multiplexing with a matrix of graphical or optical codes is a known
concept for anticounterfeiting, tracking, and authentication purposes1 of 7
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 (26, 27). Opticalmultiplexing has been achieved by incorporatingmultiple
organic dyes (28) or quantum dots (29–31) in different ratios into mi-
crospheres. The encoding capacity of themicrospheres with fluorescent
dyes is limited to ~102, whereas with quantum dots, it can be theoreti-
cally increased to 106. However, the real encoding capacity is compro-
mised by the broad and overlapping emission peaks, interference from
background luminescence, and by variations in the anticounterfeiting
tags with time due to photobleaching (32). By using lanthanide centered
emission, we eliminate all these issues and significantly increase the
encoding capacity. We can use lanthanide luminescence due to recent
advances in laser and detector technology. Lanthanide-based dyes are
highly photostable and absorb and emit light in well-defined regions of
the electromagnetic spectrum (33). The narrow absorption and emis-
sion bands originate from electronic transitions within the shielded 4f
shell and are observed across the visible spectrum in a barcode-like pat-
tern that is unique to a given lanthanide (33), and the emission signa-
tures are easily separated from emission from other sources and readily
assigned to a specific lanthanide (34, 35). The issue with using lantha-
nide(III) ions directly is that electronic transitions have small absorption
cross sections, but state-of-the-art technology negates this problem.
Theirweak light absorptivity has also been circumvented by the antenna
effect of molecular ligands (33, 36) or by incorporating a large number of
the lanthanide ions into an inorganic crystal (33, 37). We use a high den-
sity of lanthanide(III) ions doped in a zeolite crystal. The lanthanide(III)
ion cannot bleach, and the highly robust zeolite host ensures that the
physical keys will not change in time.Carro-Temboury et al., Sci. Adv. 2018;4 : e1701384 26 January 2018RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
An anticounterfeiting or authentication system based on PUFs consists
of several elements. First, there is the physical key—here, a physical
randompattern or PUF key—that is read using a specific hardware. The
readout—here, an image—is digitized using a specific set of parameters
creating the digital key, which is stored in a database. For anticounter-
feiting, the process is performed at the point of origin of the product,
and subsequent authentication then relies on rereading the physical key
and converting the readout to a new digital key. This new digital key is
then authenticated by comparing it to the stored digital key using
dedicated software.
The physical key
We made the physical key by producing a random pattern formed
from taggants made from zeolite 5A [Linde Type A (LTA)], where the
counterions (Ca2+) have been exchanged by the relevant lanthanide(III)
ions (see the SupplementaryMaterials for details) (38). The taggants are
thus zeolites (microporous crystalline aluminosilicates) exchanged using
an aqueous solutions of europium(III), terbium(III), anddysprosium(III)
cations. The zeolites used are cubes with 2- to 4-mm edges (Fig. 1E). The
three different taggants (Eu@LTA, Tb@LTA, andDy@LTA)weremixed
in water containing 3% (w/v) PVA [molecular weight (Mw) = 13,000 to
23,000], and the resulting suspensionwas spin-coated onto amicroscope
glass slide to form the random patterns with the properties represented
in cartoon form in Fig. 1. The random patterns can be embossed in steel
or leather, or the doped zeolites can be encased in glass. The stability of
the random pattern and, thus, the physical key is determined by the sub-
strate material used. Here, PVA on glass was used, where PVA is the
limiting material. PVA is stable up to 200°C but is water-soluble. We
didnotobserve any issueswith stability of thephysical keysover18months
at ambient conditions but realize that a glass support may be too frag-
ile and that water-soluble glue is not ideal for real-world applications.
A selection of other tags on paper and glass are shown in the Supple-
mentary Materials.
The readout
When the zeolites are doped with lanthanide ions, the narrow absorp-
tion and emission bands resulting from lanthanide centered emission
canbothbeused to resolve the optical response (Fig. 2). Emission-resolved
imaging allows the three taggants to be differentiated using their unique
emission spectra (Fig. 2A), whereas the excitation-resolved imaging differ-
entiates them on the basis of unique absorption bands (Fig. 2B). In the
latter case, the emission can be recorded from the lanthanide-loaded
zeolites following excitation using a wavelength that addresses an ab-
sorption band of the targeted lanthanide ion (Fig. 2B); each of the
selected lanthanide ions—Eu3+, Tb3+, and Dy3+—may be addressed
individually (Fig. 2B), which allows the emission of each lanthanide ion
to be resolved despite overlapping emission spectra (Fig. 2A). The two
methods have very different requirements when designing hardware for
optical authentication of the randompatterns: Emission-resolvedmethod
requires either a spectrometer or a filter-based detection, whereas for
excitation-resolved method, only a single long-pass filter and a total in-
tensity detector are enough to collect the emission, because only one
lanthanide emits upon one selected excitation line. Further, if a filter-
based hardware unit is used for emission-resolved readout, then it may
be emulatedusing other emitters,whereas the excitation-resolved readout
cannot because no other emitters have the narrow absorption bands ex-
hibited by the lanthanide(III) ions. Thus, the excitation-selected readout
adds an additional layer of security to the physical key.Fig. 1. PUFs made from lanthanide(III)-doped zeolites in polymer thin films.
PUFs are random patterns, made from three different optically active taggants
immobilized in a polymer thin film on a substrate and imaged using 30 pixels × 30 pixels.
(A) The pattern can be read by resolving two, four, or seven optical responses. (B) The
maximum encoding capacity of the pattern scales with the number of possible re-
sponses and the number of pixels read. (C) A cartoon representation of the same
pattern read using two (binary), four (RGB+K), and seven (RGB-CMYK) responses.
(D) Maximum encoding capacity as a function of the number of pixels used. (E) A
random pattern made in a stochastic process by casting a solution of lanthanide-
doped LTA zeolites and a polymer matrix onto a glass substrate (zeolite image
from http://eng.thesaurus.rusnano.com/wiki/article1965).2 of 7
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 Whereas emission-resolved imaging is well established, excitation-
resolved imaging using close-lying absorption bands is not. To demon-
strate thatwe are achieving excitation-resolved images, we used physical
keys made using single taggants (Eu@LTA, Tb@LTA, or Dy@LTA).
The taggants can be imaged following excitation at 450 nm for dyspro-
sium, 465 nm for europium, and 488 nm for terbium. The images and
spectra in Fig. 3 were recorded using a charge-coupled device (CCD)–
based spectrometer (39, 40), and the emission spectra were recorded for
each pixel. The narrow barcode-like emission lines leave no doubt as to
the nature of the emitting species. The dysprosium emission is signifi-
cantly weaker than that of europium or terbium but still detectable. The
weaker signal of Dy3+ is predictable and due to nonradiative de-
activation by high-energy O–H oscillators of water molecules trapped
in the zeolite (33).
To further validate the excitation-selected imaging, we imaged the
same physical key containing all three Ln taggants using spectrally re-
solved imaging (CCD-based spectrometer as detector) and excitation-
resolved imaging [avalanche photodiode (APD) detectorwith a 532-nm
long-pass filter]. The result is shown in Fig. 4, where the thin film was
imaged using 465-, 488-, and 450-nm excitation wavelengths individu-
ally or all simultaneously. The emission spectra of each pixel were re-
corded and used to verify the origin of the recorded photons following
excitation at the selected wavelength (see fig. S9). Cursory inspection of
Fig. 4 shows that excitation-resolved imaging using lanthanide centered
emission is as effective a tool as spectrally resolved imaging, demonstrat-
ing that eithermethodoutlined inFig. 2maybe used to resolve the binary
response of a random pattern formed by these taggants (see the Sup-
plementary Materials for details). The images in Fig. 4 show that the
dysprosium centered emission is very weak when compared to the terbium
and europium centered emissions; too weak to perform well in flu-
orescence microscopy but sufficient to be used in excitation-selected
multiplexing (see below).
More than one lanthanide has to be used in the PUF key because the
method relies on the fact that the image cannot be emulated by other
means. The narrow energy range used for excitation is deliberate, be-
cause all other emitters would be excited by all three excitation lines.
Thus, an anticounterfeiting tag cannot be copied bybleaching of organic
dyes or clever positioning of quantum dots, because these will emit in
all channels. The lanthanide ions used here give very good contrast in
excitation-selected imaging, particularly the combination using only
europium and terbium. Micromanipulation of doped zeolites is the-
oretically possible, but the time and equipment needed to copy a single
key combined with frequent validation eliminate the risk posed from
such a laborious endeavor.
To obtain our readout, we used a homebuilt microscope. The next
step in developing the optical authentication systemwill be tomanufac-
ture dedicated readers that can be placed throughout the supply chain.
The reader hardwaremust be of a quality that ensures that the readout is
within the specifications required by the digitization procedures for
each individual reader and thus between the points in the supply chain.
The digitization tolerates a specific error in each channel of the readout
(see below and the SupplementaryMaterials). Different reader hardware
will result in different readouts. Thus, a change of reader hardware
changes the entire authentication system.
The digital key
By increasing the number of possible responses in each pixel, excitation
selection gives a higher spatial density encoding capacity than scattering-
based methods, thus removing a possible limitation imposed by a lowCarro-Temboury et al., Sci. Adv. 2018;4 : e1701384 26 January 2018encoding capacity of the resulting authentication systems (16). The
multiple responses add complexity in the digital key because reading
the physical key requires that three images are recorded using three
different, energetically closely spaced, excitation wavelengths. Here,
465-, 488-, and 450-nm laser lines were used. The total intensity of
each pixel is then recorded for each excitation channel and digitized
in a binary form. The three images are then combined, where a color is
designated for pixels where emission is detected following excitation
using a specific laser line. We assigned letters/colors to pixels where
emission is detected following excitation by a specific laser line: R to
465 nm (Eu3+), G to 488 nm (Tb3+), and B to 450 nm (Dy3+). Thus, the
three digitized images can be combined into one RGB digital key where
the absence of a signal corresponds to black (R = 0, G = 0, and B = 0
[000]), whereas a signal in only one of the channels gives rise to the
primary RGB colors (red [100], green [010], and blue [001]). Because
the encoding capacity is defined by the number of pixels imaged (p) and
the number of possible responses, this digital key has an encoding ca-
pacity of 4p (see the Supplementary Materials for details). By including
colocalization in the digitization procedure, the number of responses
can be increased to seven with an encoding capacity of 7p. This can
be achieved by decreasing the resolution in the image so that more than
one taggant is present in each pixel or by including more than one
lanthanide(III) ion in each taggant. When including colocalization,
the colors are still defined by the number of excitation wavelengths that
give rise to a signal, but now, signals in more than one channel are in-
cluded as additional colors: yellow [110], magenta [101], and cyan
[011]. White [111], with emission detected in all three channels, will
not occur because of the noise reduction protocol used in the digitiza-
tion procedure (see the Supplementary Materials). If the resolution orFig. 2. Light emission and absorption are equal when it comes to resolving
random patterns of lanthanide(III)-doped zeolites. (A and B) The emission (A)
and the excitation (B) spectra resulting from lanthanide centered emission from
zeolites doped with Eu3+ (red), Tb3+ (green), and Dy3+ (blue) ions. Both emission
and excitation information can be used to resolve the binary optical response
(taggant is absent or present in a pixel) from a random pattern of doped zeolites
in a polymer film into four channels (RGB+K).3 of 7
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 taggant loading does not require the digitization to include colocali-
zation, then only combinations involving the pure RGB colors will be
present in the images even when the digitization software allow for
colocalization.
The exponential law dictates that the encoding capacity quickly rises
toward infinity as a function of the number of pixels with both four and
seven responses. Because ourmethod grants full control over the size of
the imaged area, only data storage and the computing power needed to
perform the point-by-point comparison of two digital keys limit the
maximumencoding capacity. The actual encoding capacity is determined
by the full system. As an example, we use the RGB-CMYK approach
with seven responses and an RGB+K approach with four responses and
60 pixels × 60 pixels images resulting in maximum encoding capacities
of 73600 and 43600, respectively. Primarily due to the physical dimensions
of the taggants, the actual encoding capacity is reduced to 6 × 10104 and
2.1 × 1091 (see the Supplementary Materials). If higher encoding capa-
cities are required, then these can be achieved by imaging larger areas or
by matching the physical dimensions of the taggants to the pixel size
used. By optimizing the full system, the number of responses becomes
less important. For example, using only europium and terbium with
taggants matched to the pixel size of a video graphics array (VGA)
image sensor will result in an actual encoding capacity of 4307200.
To form the digital key from the raw readout, we used a process in-
volving several steps (see Fig. 5). Several sets of parameters are used in
the digitization process. These add another layer of security to the au-
thentication system, because authentication can only be achieved by
using the correct parameters. If one parameter is changed, then a differ-
ent digital key is produced. The input is the three raw images of total
emission intensity versus pixel recorded following excitation at one of
the three selected wavelengths. Each data set is individually noise-
reduced using a relative and an absolute threshold value resulting in
three noise-reduced images (Fig. 5A). Below the thresholds, the inten-
sity of pixels is forced to be zero: The relative threshold sets all the pixels
of an image that are below a certain percent of the maximum intensity
of the image to zero, and the absolute threshold sets all the pixels with
less than a certain number of counts per second to zero. The latterCarro-Temboury et al., Sci. Adv. 2018;4 : e1701384 26 January 2018avoids considering noise as signal if the image has a poor signal-to-noise
ratio. The noise reduction reduces the encoding capacity but is crucial
for a proper digitization (see the Supplementary Materials).
In the next step of the process, the three noise-reduced image sets are
considered together in a digitization process that results in three binary
images (Fig. 5B). The color condition [RGB] of a given pixel depends on
the intensity determined in the pixel in all three noise-reduced images
and is locked to a hardware-specific level of cross-talk between the laser
lines. The cross-talk limits are unique for a given system and add anoth-
er layer of protection. In the authentication system demonstrated here,
we require that the corresponding signal in theTb3+ channel (G)AND/OR
Dy3+ channel (B) is less than 0.1 times the intensity of the Eu3+ channel (R)
for a pixel to be [1**]. Otherwise, the pixel is considered [0**]. If we
require both conditions to be true (AND operator), then we are using
the RGB+K approach, whereas the OR operator allows for colocaliza-
tion, and is used in the RGB-CMYK approach. By merging the three
digitized images, the digital key (Fig. 5C) is created.Note that pixelswith
colocalization appear black in the RGB+Kapproach. The file sizes of the
corresponding digital keys in either scheme are only 21.09 kilobytes,
and the size of the digital file depends only on the number of pixels
in the data set (see the Supplementary Materials).
Authentication
The full authentication system is outlined in Fig. 6. To realize the exam-
ple in Fig. 6, we suggest that the taggants are included in the polymer
used for the blister pack; thus, the physical key is simply a selected
area of the pack. The full authentication system contains three levels
of security: the physical key, the digitization software including noise
reduction and cross-talk definitions, and the acceptance criteria
for comparing two digital keys from the same physical key. The accept-
ance criteria will depend strongly on the reader hardware. When using
our setup and the RGB+K scheme, we suggest an acceptance criterion,
where an error margin of 40% in each channel is tolerated. This gives
rise to a false-positive probability of 3.6 × 10−96, which is acceptable for
all practical purposes (see the SupplementaryMaterials). The errormar-
gin allows small differences between the individual readers used at
separate points in the supply chain. Because the read time is short
and digital processing is fast, the false positives can be fully eliminatedFig. 3. Emission-resolved images of zeolites dopedwith europium(III), terbium(III),
and dysprosium(III) ions. (A) Emission spectra of Eu3+-, Tb3+-, and Dy3+-doped
zeolites recorded upon 465-, 488-, or 450-nm excitation, respectively, from a
single pixel with the CCD-based spectrometer system using 6.4- to 7.2-mW excitation
power and 20-s integration time. (B) The corresponding confocal fluorescence image
of Eu3+-, Tb3+-, and Dy3+-doped zeolites (10 mm × 10 mm, 50 pixels × 50 pixels, and
1- to 2-s integration time). Intensities in Tb3+ and Dy3+ images are multiplied by the
factor indicated.Fig. 4. Comparing emission- and excitation-resolved images of zeolites
doped with europium(III), terbium(III), and dysprosium(III) ions. The three
excitation wavelengths (R, 465 nm; G, 488 nm; and B, 450 nm) were first used sepa-
rately and then simultaneously (R + G + B) to identify each taggant. (A) Emission-resolved
images of a mixture of Eu3+-, Tb3+-, and Dy3+-doped zeolites (30 mm × 30 mm,
60 pixels × 60 pixels, 1-s integration time per pixel, and 6.4- to 7.2-mW excitation
power). (B) Excitation-resolvedAPD-based intensity images (20-ms integration time
per pixel and 0.5- to 0.6-mWexcitation power) of the same region.4 of 7
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 by performing the authentication operation in triplicate. Note that the
acceptance criteria must be tailored to the actual anticounterfeiting tags
and hardware used. To demonstrate the authentication system as an
anticounterfeiting measure, we have implemented and tested one set
of two acceptance criteria. Figure 6 summarizes the requirements of
an anticounterfeiting system, where products must be authenticated
at all points in the supply chain (41, 42), and includes an example where
we have challenged our systemwith two products with an authentic and
a fake anticounterfeiting tag. The PUF tag was registered at the point of
origin by reading the physical key and storing a copy of the digital key.
The digital key was then used to authenticate the physical key, which
was reread four times to illustrate the different points in the supply
chain. Physical keys that did not match the digital key were not authen-
ticated (see the Supplementary Materials).
In summary, we have demonstrated an optical authentication sys-
tem, exploiting the unique optical properties of trivalent lanthanide ions,
PUFs, state-of-the-art optical technology, and cryptographic approaches.
The optical authentication system can be used for unbreakable encryp-
tion but was demonstrated for anticounterfeiting purposes. When used
as an anticounterfeiting system, the manufacturer tags a product with a
unique physical key and records the digital key corresponding to the PUF
key in a read-only public database. Thenumber of unique physical keys is
near infinite, and coincidentally identical anticounterfeiting tags will not
occur. In addition, because the PUF key is unique and cannot be copied,
there is no need for secrecy. Merchants and end users can then verify the
authenticity of the product using shop-based or personal readers that,
knowing the type of product, look up the digital key in the corresponding
manufacturers’ section of the database. The large parameter space of theCarro-Temboury et al., Sci. Adv. 2018;4 : e1701384 26 January 2018randomly generated PUF keys made from affordable materials enables a
simple approach to authentication of consumer goods, medicine, pass-
ports, or electronic components subjected to counterfeiting. The robust
physical keys can either be grafted onto the product or supplied as thin
films. The fundamental properties of the lanthanide ions exploited in
excitation-selected imaging cannot be emulated, the structures cannot be
printed, and product keys are registered by trusted manufacturers. All
three facts would individually make the method tamper-proof. The ec-
onomic benefit in upholding trademark and intellectual property rights
is substantial, and using the excitation-selected imaging of lanthanide-
doped zeolites to ensure the authenticity of medicine will save lives.MATERIALS AND METHODS
Tb(III) acetate hydrate (99.9%) and Eu(III) acetate hydrate (99.9%)
were purchased from Sigma-Aldrich, and Dy(III) acetate hydrate
(99.9%) was purchased from Strem Chemicals. LTA zeolites were a gift
from UOP Antwerpen PVA (98% hydrolyzed; average Mw, 13,000 to
23,000) was purchased from Sigma-Aldrich. All chemicals were used
as received. Milli-Q water was used to prepare all reagents.
Loading of zeolites with lanthanides
To exchange the Ca2+ cations within the pores and cavities of the LTA
zeolitewith Ln3+ cations (Dy3+, Eu3+, orTb3+), 200mgof LTAwasmixed
with 800 ml of 0.25MLn3+ acetate hydrate dissolved inMilli-Qwater and
mixed overnight (IKAVortex 3) at room temperature. The Ln3+-exchanged
zeolites were recovered and washed three times with 1 ml of Milli-Q water
by centrifugation (1000 rpm, 2min; Force 12,Denver Instrument) and then
dispersed into 1ml ofMilli-Qwater. For themodel system validation, 1mg
of each Ln3+-doped zeolites in 3% (w/v) PVA/water was spin-coated on a
22-mm×22-mmmicroscope glass slide (Menzel-Gläser no. 1.5) for ~1min
to form a thin film.Fig. 6. An optical authentication system based on imaging of excitation-
selected lanthanide luminescence used as an anticounterfeiting system. A
product is authenticated using a physical key and readers at critical points in
the supply chain. The physical key is read, digitized (second to fourth read) (B to
D), and matched to the digital key (first read) (A) that was stored in the cloud by
the manufacturer. Counterfeit products can enter at all points in the supply chain but
will be eliminated by trusted retailers (green arrow). Counterfeits may be introduced
directly to the end user (red arrow), who then must authenticate the product using a
personal reader [fifth read (E) or random pattern (F)] or consult a trusted retailer.Fig. 5. Converting the read physical key into a digital key using either four or
seven responses. The digitization process of excitation-selected (R, 465; G, 488; and
B, 450 nm) images of one physical key made from a mixture of Eu3+-, Tb3+-, and
Dy3+-doped zeolites in PVA (30 mm × 30 mm, 60 pixels × 60 pixels, and 20-ms
integration time). (A) Noise-reduced images. (B) Digitized images in the RGB-
CMYK scheme. (C) The digital key formed using the RGB+K scheme without co-
localization and the RGB-CMYK scheme with colocalization. In the digital key,
the colors correspond to Eu3+ (R = [100]), Tb3+ (G = [010]), Dy3+ (B = [001]), Tb3+
and Dy3+ (C = [011]), Eu3+ + Tb3+ (Y = [110]), Eu3+ + Dy3+ (M = [101]), and empty
(K = [000]).5 of 7
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 Ln3+ spectroscopy
Absorption spectra (Lambda 1050 UV/Vis/NIR spectrometer, PerkinElmer)
and fluorescence excitation spectra (Cary Eclipse Fluorescence Spectro-
photometer, Agilent Technologies) were measured from 0.1 to 0.2 M Ln3+
acetate hydrate solutions in 2-mlMilli-Q water from a quartz cuvette with
a path length of 10 mm (Starna Scientific). Absorption spectra were re-
corded using a double-beam setup with Milli-Q water in the reference
channel and corrected for baseline and dark current. A Ho3+ oxide stan-
dard was used for wavelength calibration. Excitation spectra were re-
corded with 2.5-nm excitation slits, 5-nm emission slits, and 1000 V
on the detector.
Hardware setup
The confocal microscopy setup depicted in fig. S1 was used for the
excitation-selected imaging. A SuperK EXTREME EXB-6 superconti-
nuum white light laser with a SuperK SELECT wavelength selector
(NKT Photonics) was used as the excitation source. Three excitation
wavelengths were selected: 465, 488, and 450 nm. For spectral imaging,
the laser powers with 77.88-MHz repetition rate for each wavelength
were 6.4, 6.9, and 7.2 mW. For total intensity imaging, the laser powers
25.96-MHz repetition rate were 0.5, 0.6, and 0.6 mW, that is, one-twelfth
of the powers used in spectral imaging. Short-pass filters [SP1 (FES0500,
Thorlabs) and SP2 (540AESP, Omega Optical)] were added to the ex-
citation light path.
The homebuilt scanning fluorescence confocal microscopy setup
was based on an Olympus IX71 inverted microscope with a piezo-driven
scanning stage (P5173CL, Physik Instrumente), controlled by a home-
written software program (LabVIEW, National Instruments), allowing
for point-by-point imaging of the sample in a raster scanning fashion
in a range of up to 100 mm × 100 mm. Upon laser illumination, the
emission signal from the sample was collected by the same 100× oil
immersion objective (Olympus UPLFLN; numerical aperture, 1.3). A 70/30
beam splitter (XF122,Omega Filters)was used in themicroscope instead
of a dichroic mirror. A 50-mm pinhole was used in the detection path.
For the spectral imaging, the emission light was directed through
optical filters [LP (2× BLP01-532R-25) and SP3 (SP01-633RS-25); both
from Semrock] and into a nitrogen-cooled CCD-based spectrometer
[Princeton Instruments SPEC-10:100B/LN_eXcelon CCD camera and
SP-2356 spectrometer with 1-030-500 grating (300 grooves/mm at
500 nm); all controlled by the same LabVIEW program that controls
the scanner]. The x axis of the emission spectra was calibrated using
emission lines of a neon lamp (6032 neon lamp,Newport Corporation).
The y axis (intensity) was not corrected for differences in optical trans-
mission and detection efficiency.
For the total intensity–based imaging, the emission light was directed
through the sameoptical filters (LP and SP3) and into anAPD (CD3226,
PerkinElmer) connected to time-correlated single photon counting elec-
tronics (SPC-830,Becker&Hickl).Ahome-writtenMATLAB(MathWorks)
routine was used to create images from the recorded first in, first out
(FIFO) data files [see the Supplementary information in the study of
Liao et al. (40)]. The optimized filters SP1, SP2, LP, and SP3 were always
used in the data described in the section “Excitation-selected imaging” and
onward in the SupplementaryMaterials. The full spectral information
was recorded without SP3 when investigating the model system.SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
Supplementary material for this article is available at http://advances.sciencemag.org/cgi/
content/full/4/1/e1701384/DC1
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Authentication
Data management
fig. S1. Cartoon of the optical setup.
fig. S2. Absorption spectra.
fig. S3. Emission spectra measured with a confocal microscope and a CCD-based spectrometer.
fig. S4. Detailed emission spectra of Dy3+-doped zeolites.
fig. S5. Spectrally resolved excitation-selected images measured with CCD for Dy3+-doped zeolite.
fig. S6. Spectrally resolved excitation-selected images measured with CCD for Eu3+-doped
zeolite.
fig. S7. Spectrally resolved excitation-selected images measured with CCD for Tb3+-doped zeolite.
fig. S8. CCD images of a mixture of Dy3+-, Eu3+-, and Tb3+-doped zeolites.
fig. S9. Confocal luminescence images of a mixture of Eu3+-, Tb3+-, and Dy3+-doped zeolites
using a CCD detector.
fig. S10. Transmission electron microscopy image of Tb3+-doped zeolite.
fig. S11. Confocal luminescence images of a mixture of Eu3+-, Tb3+-, and Dy3+-doped zeolites
using an APD detector.
fig. S12. Emission spectra measured with a confocal microscope and a CCD-based
spectrometer (using SP3 filter in the emission path).
fig. S13. Emission spectra in logarithmic scale (same data as in fig. S12), measured with a
confocal microscope and a CCD-based spectrometer (using SP3 filter in the emission path).
fig. S14. Cross-talk characterization.
fig. S15. Detailed explanation of the digitization process with key M3Z2A as example.
fig. S16. Confocal luminescence images of a mixture of Eu3+-, Tb3+-, and Dy3+-doped zeolites.
fig. S17. Confocal luminescence images of a mixture of Eu3+-, Tb3+-, and Dy3+-doped zeolites.
fig. S18. Confocal luminescence images of a mixture of Eu3+- and Tb3+-doped zeolites.
fig. S19. Confocal luminescence images of a mixture of Eu3+- and Tb3+-doped zeolites.
fig. S20. RGB images of zeolites doped with Eu3+, Tb3+, Dy3+, and nothing.
fig. S21. RGB images of co-stained zeolites.
fig. S22. The influence of multicolor, taggant size, image resolution, and taggant density on
encoding capacity.
fig. S23. Illustration of model keys (12- × 12-pixel big squares) for different variables when
changing different variables.
fig. S24. Defining an acceptance threshold from criteria 1 (checking all the pixels).
fig. S25. Criteria 2 analysis.
fig. S26. Authentication protocol using verification according to criteria 1 and criteria 2.
fig. S27. Demonstration on how the verification criteria 2 works.
fig. S28. Performance of the reader according to criteria 2.
fig. S29. Verification figures from key M3Z2A according to criteria 2.
fig. S30. Epi-illumination bright-field images of anticounterfeiting tags.
fig. S31. Photostability of Eu@LTA and Tb@LTA compared to fluorescein.
table S1. Matrix of binary combinations of Eu3+, Tb3+, and Dy3+ for zeolite loading.
table S2. Cross-talk from the spectra in fig. S12 without background subtraction.
table S3. Cross-talk from the spectra in fig. S12 with background subtraction.
table S4. Cross-talk matrix derived from total intensities of images in fig. S14 without
background subtraction.
table S5. Cross-talk matrix derived from total intensities of images in fig. S14 with background
subtraction.
table S6. Description of two possible reader configurations used to digitize the physical keys.
table S7. Encoding capacity of all the measured keys and of ideal keys with the same physical
zeolite size, same scan resolution, higher scan size, and nominal zeolite density.
table S8. Probability of a random key code guessing any database code when using criteria 1.
table S9. Criteria 1 and 2 performance with sparsely populated keys.
table S10. Summary of the performance of authenticity of criteria 1 and 2 in fig. S26.
table S11. Performance of the reader assessed with match criteria 2.
table S12. Strength of the key upon variation of digitization parameters.
table S13. File sizes of two different types of images as an example of typical file size.REFERENCES AND NOTES
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